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IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
V» j 
CLINTON FERRIER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 970117-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (1996). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Must defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute be reversed because, on 
different facts, he was acquitted of simple possession? 
When considering an inconsistency challenge to a jury's 
verdicts, this Court will "review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict" and will "not overturn a jury's verdict 
of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds could not rationally 
have arrived at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based 
on the law and on the evidence presented." State v. Berawerff, 777 
P.2d 510, 511 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this appeal does not require the interpretation 
of any statute, rule, or constitutional provision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In April 1996, defendant was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a 
controlled substance, possession of stolen property, and possession 
of drug paraphernalia (R. 18-19). The court dismissed the 
possession-of-stolen-property charge at trial pursuant to 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict (R. 318-19). Defendant 
was subsequently convicted by a jury of possession with intent to 
distribute and acquitted of possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of paraphernalia (R. 122-24, 416) . Defendant was 
sentenced to the statutory term of one to fifteen years (R. 161). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 164). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 28, 1996, Officer Jim Eberling stopped a red Ford 
pickup for having no license plates (R. 229). The driver, Charles 
Lane, was arrested for driving on a suspended license; Lane's 
passenger, Michelle Boyce, was released (R. 229-232). 
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Officer Eberling, assisted by Officer Rowley, performed an 
inventory of the car before impounding it (R. 230, 232) . The 
officers discovered a small set of drug scales in the glove box and 
a small bottle containing a liquid which they suspected was "acid" 
(R. 230-31, 238, 247) . 
While Officer Eberling took Lane to jail, Officer Rowley went 
to Days Inn, where Boyce was staying, to investigate her connection 
to the scales (R. 232-33, 247) . Boyce and defendant were both 
there; she consented to a search of the motel room (R. 247-48). 
Officer Rowley discovered, among other things, a small propane 
torch, a piece of tin foil, a snort tube, and a piece of glass from 
a light bulb, all items commonly used for ingesting drugs (R. 24 9, 
256). He also uncovered three firearms and several rounds of 
bullets, a wad of cash, and several small bags of methamphetamine 
packaged for resale (R. 250-57, 261). 
During the search, Officer Rowley also found two notes (R. 
262). One said: "Michelle, went with Clinton for a while. Things 
are looking good, be back soon. Love You, Chuck." (id.). The note 
had dollar signs written across it (id.). Defendant and Boyce were 
both arrested for possession with intent to distribute (R. 261). 
At defendant's trial, Charles Lane testified that he traveled 
to Monticello from Farmington, New Mexico with defendant and Boyce 
in order to sell drugs (R. 282, 308) . Defendant owed him money and 
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had informed him that they could make more money selling drugs in 
Utah than in New Mexico (R. 282-83, 301). 
Once in Monticello, the trio rented a motel room (R. 284, 
308). Lane and defendant proceeded to weigh and package 
methamphetamine (R. 284-86, 294, 309-10). After they had "weighed 
it up," they consumed what was left over (R. 287). Lane "snorted 
it"; defendant smoked it by placing it on some glass from a broken 
light bulb, holding a lighter under it, and inhaling the smoke 
through a straw (R. 287-88).l 
Lane then wrote the dollar-sign note to Michelle Boyce, who 
was sleeping; its meaning, Lane testified, was that defendant would 
be repaying him from the proceeds of drug sales the two of them 
were going to complete (R. 292). Lane then accompanied defendant 
while he made two drug transactions (R. 289-91, 295) . First, 
defendant traded a "gram of dope" for a .357 Smith & Wesson at a 
location which Lane believed to be defendant's step-sister's home 
(R. 290, 298). Later in the day, defendant and Lane returned to 
the home and defendant sold his step-sister a gram of 
methamphetamine for $80 (R. 291). Following these sales, defendant 
paid Lane the money he owed him (R. 293-95, 311).2 
1
 This conduct formed the basis of the possession charge (R. 
380-81). 
2
 This conduct formed the basis of the possession with intent 
to distribute charge (R. 379-80). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his conviction for drug possession with 
intent to distribute must be reversed because it is inconsistent 
with his acquittal on the drug possession and paraphernalia 
possession charges. This argument fails because (1) inconsistency 
is not a ground for reversal; and (2) these verdicts were not 
inconsistent, since the charges arose from different conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
INCONSISTENCY IS NOT A SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SET ASIDE A 
JURY VERDICT AND, IN ANY EVENT, THESE VERDICTS WERE NOT 
INCONSISTENT 
Defendant claims that the jury's verdicts on the possession-
with-intent-to-distribute count (guilty) and the simple possession 
and possession of paraphernalia counts (not guilty) were 
inconsistent and that this inconsistency raises a reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt. See Br. Aplt. at 11. He further argues that both 
counts rested on the testimony of the same witness, Charles Lane, 
and that the jury could not rationally believe him as to one charge 
and disbelieve him as to the others. Id. 
A. A guilty verdict may not be attacked merely because it is 
inconsistent with a not guilty verdict in the same trial. 
It is well settled that "a criminal defendant convicted by a 
jury on one count [can] not attack that conviction because it was 
inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another 
count." United States v. Powell. 469 U.S. 57, 58 (1984) (citing 
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)); accord State v. 
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Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986) ("the inconsistency of 
verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts 
aside") (citations emitted); State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134 
(Utah App.) (same), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
In some cases the evidence would seem logically to compel a 
jury to convict on both charges or to acquit on both; a split 
verdict creates a dilemma. Defendants, of course, argue that the 
acquittal proves that the jury disbelieved the critical evidence 
and therefore that the conviction is unsupported by the evidence. 
See, e.g.. Stewart, 729 P.2d at 614. 
However, "[i]t is equally possible that the jury, convinced of 
guilt, properly reached its conclusion on [one] offense, and then 
through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent 
conclusion on the [other] offense." Powell, 469 U.S. at 65; accord 
Stewart, 729 P.2d at 614. Thus, "inconsistent verdicts in criminal 
trials need not be set aside, but may instead be viewed as a 
demonstration of the jury's leniency." Powell, 469 U.S. at 61. 
Although it of course has "no right to exercise" this power, a jury 
"wish[ing] to avoid an all-or-nothing verdict" may assume it. Id. 
at 66. 
Although respecting inconsistent verdicts leaves the logical 
tension unresolved, it is the fair result, since a defendant 
convicted on a split verdict may attack the conviction as 
unsupported by the evidence, see, e.g.. State v. Bergwerff, 777 
6 
P.2d 510, 512 (Utah App. 1989), whereas a contrary resolution— 
reconciling the verdicts by reversing the conviction—would leave 
the government without recourse. Powell. 469 U.S. at 65. 
Accordingly, defendant's contention that "an internal 
inconsistency in the Jury's verdicts" provides a "basis for 
reversal," Br. Aplt. at 11, fails as a matter of law. 
B. These verdicts were consistent. 
Defendant's claim fails also as a matter of fact, since the 
jury's verdicts were consistent. The unstated premise of 
defendant's argument is that one who is not guilty of drug 
possession cannot logically be guilty of possession with an intent 
to distribute. However, this apparent truism fails if the drugs 
one is charged with possessing and the drugs one is charged with 
distributing are different drugs. 
Here they were. The prosecutor asked the jury to convict 
defendant of simple possession based on testimony that defendant 
smoked methamphetamine in the motel room (see R. 287-88, 296, 310, 
380-81) . He asked the jury to convict defendant of possession with 
intent to distribute based on evidence that defendant later 
delivered other methamphetamine to his step-sister (see R. 289-91, 
295, 298, 379-80). The prosecutor explained this clearly to the 
jury in closing argument: 
With regard to possession, how does [defendant] 
possess drugs in this case? Well, he possesses the drugs 
he was distributing, but we haven't charged him with the 
two crimes — we haven't charged him with two crimes being 
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the same conduct. What did he possess in addition to 
what he was distributing? He possessed the drugs he did 
in the motel room with Mr. Lane . . . He possessed the 
drugs that he consumed in the iightbulb, he possessed the 
drugs that he snorted in the snort tube. That's 
different than possession with intent to distribute. 
That's why we have two charges. 
(R. 380-81) (emphasis added). Accordingly, since the different 
verdicts were based on different conduct, they were factually 
consistent. 
Furthermore, that the charge on which defendant was convicted 
and the charges on which he was acquitted all rested on the 
testimony of Charles Lane does not create an inconsistency, as 
defendant argues. See Br. Aplt. at 11. The jury may have believed 
all of Lane's testimony and acquitted defendant on the possession 
charges as an act of grace. 
The jury also had the prerogative to believe part of Lane's 
testimony and reject part: "It is elementary that the fact finder 
may accept all, part, or none of a witness's testimony." Stewart, 
729 P.2d at 612. Accord State v. Haves. 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part 
of any witness's testimony.").3 Accordingly, they may have 
harbored a reasonable doubt as to the uncorroborated portions of 
Lane's testimony. 
3
 In keeping with this principle, the jurors were instructed 
that they were "not bound to believe all that the witnesses may 
have testified to" (R. 367). 
8 
Lane's testimony that defendant smoked methamphetamine— 
supporting the possession charge—was uncorroborated (see R. 287-
88, 310). However, his testimony that defendant sold drugs— 
supporting the intent to distribute charge—was corroborated by the 
note that Lane had written to Michelle Boyce. That note indicated 
that defendant participated in, or at least aided and abetted in, 
the distribution of methamphetamine (R. 292).4 In addition, 
defendant's remarks to the officers during the motel room search 
corroborated the distribution charge by demonstrating that he was 
aware of some drugs in the motel room that had been packaged for 
resale.5 
There was, in sum, no inconsistency in these verdicts. 
C. The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of 
possession with intent to distribute. 
The bottom line here is that the evidence at trial, viewed "in 
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict," was not "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that a reasonable person 
must have reasonably doubted [defendant's] guilt." Berawerff. Ill 
P.2d at 511-12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
4
 The note stated: "Michelle, went with Clinton for a 
while. Things are looking good, be back soon. Love you, Chuck." 
(R. 262). The note also had dollar signs written across it (Id.) 
5
 Specifically, defendant identified one of Mr. Lane's bags 
as a "marble bag" and stated it belonged to Lane (R. 263, 264, 
275). Police felt the bag was used for distribution because it 
contained drug paraphernalia, sandwich bags used for packaging 
drugs, and several small bags of methamphetamine ready for sale 
(R. 256-57, 261). 
9 
Charles Lane testified that he and defendant packaged some 
methamphetamine for resale and that defendant delivered it to his 
step-sister's home (see R. 284-86, 290-91, 294, 298, 309-10). This 
testimony was corroborated by Lane's note (see R. 262) and by 
defendant's knowledge of other methamphetamine that had been 
similarly packaged for resale (see R. 263-64, 275). This evidence 
was more than sufficient to convict. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this rz day of October 1997. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to William L, 
Schultz, Attorney for Appellant, 69 East Center Street, Moab, 
Utah 84532, this October 1997. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner, or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
Addendum B 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587-2128 
SEVENTH DISTRICTCOURT 
spn Juan County 
RLE* APR 1 6 1996 
CLERK Of-THE COURT 
3/ 
IJEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLINTON FERRIER 
AKA: BENJAMINE 
DOB: 12-6-72 
4203 Terrace Drive 
Farmington, NM 87401 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
* INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 9617-43 
•Officer: KENT ROWLEY JIM EBERLING 
The undersigned Complainant, CRAIG C. HALLS, under oath 
states on information and belief that the Defendant(s) committed in 
the above named County, the Crime(s) of: 
COUNT No. 1: 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE: A FELONY OF THE 2nd DEGREE in 
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(i)(ii) and (iv), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the manner 
as follows: That the said defendant on or about the 
28TH day of MARCH 1996, did knowingly and 
intentionally produce, manufacture, or dispense a 
controlled substance, to wit: Methamphetamine, or 
did distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or did possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent it distribute. 
COUNT No. 2: 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE: A Felony of 
the 3rd degree, in violation of Section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in 
the manner as follows: That the said defendant on 
or about the 28TH day of MARCH, 1996, did knowingly 
and intentionally have in his possession controlled 
substnces, to wit: Methamphetamine• 
COUNT No. 3: 
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY: A Felony of the 2nd 
degree, in violation of Section 76-6-408, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the manner as 
follows: That on or about the 28TH day of MARCH, 
1996, said defendant did have in his possession 
stolen property, to wit: a 357 firearm. 
COUNT No. 4: 
POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA: A Class B Misdemeanor, 
in violation of Section 58-37a-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended in the manner as follows: 
That the said defendant on or about the 28TH day of 
MARCH, 1996, did have in his possession 
paraphernalia used to plant, propagate, cultivate, 
grow, manufacture, produce, process, prepare, store, 
inhale, ingest, or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body. 
Contrary to the form of the Statute in such case made and 
provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Utah. 
g C. Halls 
Juan County Attorney 
DATED: April 1, 1996 
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Addendum C 
San Juan County 
"LED DEC 1 0 1996 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY, 
Deputy 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan 
County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Clinton Ferrier, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 9617-43 
We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled 
case, do find the defendant, Clinton Ferrier, GUILTY of Count No.. 
1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
DATED this 1A day of December, A.D., 1996. 
Jvi< &}*-+cJ *l*}* s Clerk 
By: Off^^fef-f^/v^r Deputy 
SEVENTH DISTRIC1 COUfil 
San Juan County 
F,LED
 DEC 1 Q 1996 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
BY. 
Deputy 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan 
County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Clinton Ferrier, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 9617-43 
We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled 
case, do find the defendant, Clinton Ferrier, NOT GUILTY of Count 
No. 2: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
DATED this JD day of December, A.D., 1996 
Foreperson 
JO . 1996 
4=2*-* JS<r('^4+fJ**' Clerk 
By: Mf^a^ZT— W3*- Deputy 
/W 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
nLED
 DEC 1 0 1936 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Deputy 
BY 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan 
County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Clinton Ferrier, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 9617-43 
We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled 
case, do find the defendant, Clinton Ferrier, NOT GUILTY of Count 
No. 4: POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA. 
DATED this ML day of December, A.D., 1996. 
Foreperson 
/& . 1996. 
•J't-f &<**('"'{•* M** Clerk 
By: Deputy 
Addendum D 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 FILED FPROC "">7 
San Juan County At torney r t o i / * \^{ 
P . O . BOX 8 5 0
 O J I _ , _ CtERK OF THE COURT 
Monticello, Utah 84535 BY. 
Phone 587-2128 Oeputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLINTON FERRIER, 
Defendant(8)• 
• 
* 
• 
# 
FINDINGS, JUDGMENT 
AND COMMITMENT 
Criminal No. 9617-43 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 6TH 
day of FEBRUARY, 1997, before the above entitled Court, Craig C. 
Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and. 
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, William L. 
Schultz 
The Defendant was convicted by a jury to POSSESSION WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve 
a term of One to Fifteen Years (1-15). 
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into 
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State 
Prison. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and 
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that 
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the 
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detaining, and delivering said Defendant* 
Clerk of Jfche Court 
